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At the Edge of the Modern?
Diplomacy, Public Relations, and Media Practices during Houphouët-Boigny’s 1962 Visit to the U.S.

Abou B. Bamba
Gettysburg College

Toward the end of the first decade after the decolonization of most African
countries, there emerged a scholarly polemic about the weight of bureaucratic politics in
the making of foreign policy in the Third World. A mirror of the reigning modernization
paradigm that informed most postwar area studies and social sciences, the discussion
unintentionally indexed the narcissism of a hegemonic discourse on political
development and statecraft.1 Graham Allison and Morton Halperin—the original
proponents of the bureaucratic model—implied in their largely U.S.-centric model that
such a paradigm was not applicable to non-industrialized countries since the newly
decolonized countries, for the most part, lacked the institutional/organizational base and
political tradition needed to conduct a modern foreign policy.2 Félix HouphouëtBoigny—leader of the newly independent Ivory Coast—was hardly mentioned in the
scholarly debates on the bureaucratic model.3 Yet one can use the conjuncture of his visit
to the United States in May 1962 to explore the arguments developed by the protagonists
in the polemic that ensued the publication of the Allison-Halperin theory.4
The choice of Houphouët-Boigny for such exploration is important on more than
one account. Usually seen as a conservative in African politics, the Ivorian leader was
reportedly a traditionalist who treated “foreign policy as his personal domain.”5
Described as a “deceptively ruthless autocrat,” Le Vieux (i.e., Old Wise Man) apparently
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“allowed no place in Ivorian newspapers for criticism or close analysis of his policies or
personality.”6 Even more, he is said to have harbored a deeply seated mistrust for modern
mass communication techniques, especially their power in the international arena.7 All of
these scholarly imaginaries make the Ivorian leader one of the most fitted candidates for
an historical study that attempts to link the discourse on (political) modernization to
media practices and the making of African diplomacy.
While the American trip of Houphouët-Boigny had certainly economic imports, I
limit my inquiry into the ways in which the presidential voyage was diplomatically
orchestrated.8 Indeed, at a time when Euro-American governments, foundations, and even
the United Nations were all trying to set up training programs to instill “basic concepts of
protocol, chancery, and diplomacy” to the elite representatives of the African countries, it
might be insightful to assess the political assets and cultural capital that the Ivorians
mobilized in order to shape the design of the trip.9 Additionally, it seems crucial to
uncover the role that the media played in constructing the meaning of the presidential
journey. In an epistemological context then (and still) marked by polarization and binary
opposition between a “modern” West and Africa as its “absolute other,”10 what does the
making of the historic voyage tell us about our analytical categories in comparative
media and international historical studies?
As I explore these issues I argue that unlike the then pervasive modernization
theory paradigm, African governments had appropriated a form of managing foreign
public affairs that satisfied the logic of media performance of modern nations. If
anything, the interwar and postwar nationalist upheavals in Africa provided a training
ground for the likes of Houphouët-Boigny who readily appropriated Euro-American
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forms of political performance to advance their agenda in the public (transnational)
sphere. As a consequence, they ultimately helped in speeding up the decolonization
process in the 1950s and thereafter.11 Whereas Le Vieux and his envoys clearly displayed
dexterity all along Houphouët-Boigny’s first post-independence visit to the United States,
I suggest that mass communication outlets—as quintessential tools of modern
transnationalism in the 20th century—played an equally critical role in the performance of
this singular moment in transnational statecraft. Journalists not only reported on the trip,
but in the very act of reportage also attempted to shape the making of the transatlantic
diplomatic spectacle. In many ways, the media treatment of the voyage in the columns of
Abidjan Matin, Fraternité, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Le Monde
could be seen as a microcosm of the uneasy triangular relations that linked Ivory Coast,
France, and the United States in the era of decolonization and post-independence nationbuilding. Analyzing this microcosm with historical hindsight, it appears that the Ivorian
press particularly stood out because of its hagiographic coverage and celebration of the
African head of state and his staged visit. Bringing nuance to this seeming confirmation
of the radical difference of African media practices and their complicity with the state, I
claim that journalists in all three countries subscribed to a “modernist” metaphysics that
nurtured and was informed by the culturally chauvinistic logic of the nation-state.
Consequently, I conclude that the normative comparativism that has usually sustained the
historiography of international media studies is more than problematic.12 Even more
intriguing, as we shall see, is the place of African diplomacy in the literature on political
development and modernization.

4
RECASTING VISIONS & ROLES:
STATECRAFT, MASS COMMUNICATION, AND POSTCOLONIAL AFRICAN DIPLOMACY

Ever since the formulation of the bureaucratic model of foreign relations in the
early 1970s, Africanists as diverse as Christopher Hill, Olajide Aluko, Peter Schraeder
have strived to show how far the Allison-Halperin thesis was misguided, at least when
applied to an African context. This is so, they have explained, because there hardly exists
any modern state in which the role of bureaucrats in formulating and implementing
foreign policy, as a process, can be ignored.13 Historically, such a conclusion does not
appear farfetched. Even before the introduction of Euro-American diplomatic procedures
into Africa, indigenous regional states relied on the expertise of shrewd envoys and
diplomatic personnel to craft and execute foreign policies.14 Working out the details of
Houphouët-Boigny’s visit to the United States, as we shall see later, seemed to confirm
this historical insight. While Ivorian foreign policy making apparatus gave exclusive
rights to the president to initiate and carry out diplomatic relations, the everyday
management of foreign policy was the domain of career diplomats, journalists, and even
members of Houphouët-Boigny’s family.15 In this light, the making of the 1962 visit
would have been difficult to plan and execute without the dexterity of not only Henri
Konan Bédié—Ivorian Ambassador to the U.S.—and the president’s wife, Marie-Thérèse
Houphouët-Boigny but also the Ivorian journalists who covered Le Vieux’s sortie.
Few historians of foreign relations have paid attention to the activities of African
envoys or informal diplomats such as Bédié or Marie-Thérèse Houphouët-Boigny, even
as recent years have witnessed a surge in scholarship attempting to transnationalize U.S.
history in connection with Africa. In fact, while many scholars have unveiled the various
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intriguing links that often connected the arrival in Washington and New York of
diplomats from Africa with some of the most fruitful outcomes of the Civil Rights
movement in the early 1960s, they have remained largely silent on the works of the
African diplomats as historical actors.16 Yet the African envoys and representatives in the
United States were very active in the performance of their duties. Many of them, for
instance, protested to American officials whenever they were the victims of racial
prejudice. In other junctures, the African diplomats made “bitter jokes” about
schizophrenic U.S. racial behaviors that strove to accommodate foreign black envoys
while denying the same privilege to African Americans. As a result of these actions, the
diplomats from Africa enjoyed a degree of visibility at the hands of contemporary
journalists—a historical situation to which the historiography has not done enough
justice.17 Even more mesmerizing in the current transnational histories of the United
States and modernization theory is the relative dearth of historical studies on how African
diplomats used mass communication and public diplomacy techniques to further their
objectives in their host country. This neglect is all the more surprising since most early
modernization theorists who have become the subjects of recent scholarly research saw
the use of the mass media by “traditional” and “transitional” societies as a significant
indication and step in their drive toward modernity.18
The evidence, if scanty, is not lacking however. During the Algerian War of
Independence, for instance, the North African nationalists skillfully used their
representative in the United States to court American public opinion.19 In a similar move,
anti-apartheid movements’ de facto roving ambassadors and South African artists in exile
cultivated U.S. audiences for their support in the struggle against the South African
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government.20 Communication scholars have referred to these strategic deployments of
the media to advance of a group or country’s foreign policy agenda as media diplomacy.
From the Iranian revolutionaries to Native American activists at Wounded Knee, freedom
fighters and embattled governments alike all courted the press to further their political
objectives in the international arena.21
The use of mass media to garner support for a cause need not be limited to
revolutionary movements and critical moments as most analysts seem to suggest. In the
early 1960s, for instance, many African countries started lobbying campaigns in an effort
to win U.S. financial assistance. Despite their limited budgets, newly independent
countries such as Liberia, Nigeria, and Ivory Coast secured the services of U.S. public
relations (PR) firms to campaign on their behalf. As a columnist of the Wall Street
Journal put it, the goal of the foreign governments in signing their contracts with a
publicity firm was to help them “cultivate the goodwill” of the American people.22 The
example of the Ivorian ambassador is as interesting and insightful as it gives an early
indication of how African diplomats actively fashioned U.S.-Africa relations during the
exciting years of the 1960s. Initially at loss in the complex maze of U.S. “big business”
world, the Ivorian envoy hired the New York-based Hamilton Wright which promised to
inundate the North American and European business world with ad displays of “120,000
lines monthly.” The American PR firm further reassured its Ivorian customers that it
would place a “13-minute documentary film” about Le Vieux’s country that would be
“shown on at least 60 television stations.”23
The impact of these PR campaigns is uncertain. Still, the judicious use of the mass
media by African envoys and representatives in the United States might be seen as an
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important component and indication of their performance of modern transnational
statecraft. Mobilizing contemporaneous information technologies, entrepreneurial leaders
attempted to shape events by constructing a certain image of themselves and/or their
actions. As they secured the service of the mass media and channeled the activities of PR
firms, African diplomats maneuvered to recast the conventional roles given them in
international statecraft. With Africa in the headlines thanks to the saga of decolonization,
they pushed for a reassessment of the continent in the international arena while branding
their respective countries as attractive havens for foreign investment.24 It was against this
backdrop of toying with modern statecraft and the mobilization of the press to advance
the cause of Africa that Le Vieux planned his voyage to the United States. Whereas the
mass media was instrumental in constructing the contested meaning of the trip, it took
human agency to craft the administrative and diplomatic scope of the presidential visit.

CRAFTING THE VISIT:
HOUPHOUËT-BOIGNY, PROTOCOL, AND THE ART OF PERSUASION

As the Ivorian leader himself underlined it in a remark on 22 May 1962, the
spring visit of that year was not his first American sortie. However, unlike earlier visits
during which he had behaved in the words of Frantz Fanon as a “traveling salesman of
French colonialism,” the trip in the spring of 1962 was the result of Le Vieux’s own
scheming.25 To have free hands so as to maneuver at will, for instance, the Ivorian
authorities refused to rely on the U.S. government to finance and thus assert control over
the presidential visit. In fact, even though the official part of the visit was to start only on
May 22, Houphouët-Boigny and his party had arrived in the United States on May 9,
ostensibly to cultivate American business constituencies. Anticipating the concerns of the
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Department of State over the bill of such long sojourn, the Ivorian authorities offered to
pay for the New York leg of the visit. Such an offer initially left many American
diplomats at Foggy Bottom wondering. But in a telegram in support of the plan, the U.S.
embassy in Abidjan cautioned the American officials not to “underestimate [the]
importance [the Ivorian government] attache[d] to the New York stay and [the]
conversations with private interests.”26 As subsequent episodes would prove it, the
meetings with the business world were part of the larger Ivorian strategy to enlist the
support of American investors in the post-independence nation-building of Ivory Coast.27
Supplementing the economic aspect of the trip was the public relations coup that
Houphouët-Boigny aimed to stage during his American visit. Although he had led his
country to independence in mid-1960, Le Vieux’s prestige remained low among younger
generations of Ivorian educated elite who were ever more critical to his political choices.
Outside the Francophone world, his leadership role too was at its lowest in African
politics, eclipsed by none other than the activism of Kwame Nkrumah—leader of Ghana
and Houphouët-Boigny’s nemesis. At home, the Ivorian president began to set up the
structural basis for his “carrot and stick” politics that eventually allowed him to remain in
power for more than 30 years. In the international arena, he indulged in a thoroughgoing
policy of re-branding and self-fashioning that culminated with the rehabilitation of his
political vision at the founding of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 at Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia.28
As his Africa-wide activism in the early 1960s suggests, Le Vieux’s voyage to
Washington appeared as a strategy to re-enhance a tarnished image. To carry out this
transnational PR operation, Houphouët-Boigny wanted to be the first African leader to be
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invited to the Kennedy White House: “Very soon after your inauguration,” Dean Rusk
reminded Kennedy during the negotiations over the administrative arrangements of the
visit, “the Ivory Coast Ambassador called on instructions to ask that his President be
given priority over all other African Chiefs of State in consideration for state visits to the
United States.”29 The request was not granted. Worse, given the high number of high
profile visitors in Washington and concerns over effective time management, the
Kennedy administration threatened to scale most African visiting leaders down to the
status of “Presidential guests,” a new category specifically created for them.30 Through
the correspondence of the American chief diplomat stationed in Abidjan, it appears that
the Ivorian leader rejected this option. Since his request of being the first African visitor
was not possible, he insisted that his visit be a “full formal state visit.” Concurring with
Le Vieux, Ambassador Reams added: “I know of no African Chief of State more aware of
protocol and Houphouët would resent anything less than maximum effort in Washington
and New York.”31 Based on this assessment and the fact that Houphouët-Boigny was still
viewed by American diplomats as the “most important single leader in the former French
African colonies,” the Office of Protocol in the Department of State acquiesced and the
Washington leg of Houphouët-Boigny’s trip was upgraded to a state visit, culminating
with a an elegant state dinner at the White House.32
Le Vieux’s diplomatic victory, however, was mixed. Concurrent with his visit, the
Ivorian leader had also hoped to receive an honorary degree from Harvard University.
This, to be sure, was meant to be another ploy in his politics of self-fashioning, especially
since he had always felt dwarfed by Kwame Nkrumah and Leopold S. Senghor both of
whom were seen as scholar-politicians. Although Fordham University had offered to give

10
the Ivorian president an honorary degree, he had turned the offer down because he
wanted his “degree from what he consider[ed] best university: Harvard.”33 Using the
auspices of his ambassador, he expressed this desire some two months before his
expected visit.34 In all likelihood, the Ivorian envoy anticipated the difficulties inherent in
pressuring the reputed Massachusetts-based institution. Refraining from making “even [a]
preliminary overture to Harvard,” as an American diplomat put it, the Ivorian ambassador
thought it “incumbent” on the U.S. government to “do the groundwork so that [a] last
minute appeal [would] not flounder.”35 Despite the prodding of some of the American
diplomats, Harvard did not seem to have been swayed. It is not clear how Le Vieux took
this rebuttal. What is beyond doubt was the refusal on the part of the Ivorian presidential
journalists to acknowledge the defeat as they went ahead to print in the columns of
Abidjan-Matin that the president received a degree from Harvard. President HouphouëtBoigny did, in fact, obtain an honorary degree; but from the University of
Pennsylvania—Harvard only allowing him to give a speech at a luncheon at the Center
for International Affairs.36
As these examples demonstrate, the behind-the-scene negotiations to arrange his
American trip revealed an Houphouët-Boigny obsessed with his public persona. In a
context where his image was battered in the public spheres of Africa and Ivory Coast, the
visit offered him an opportunity to re-brand himself. However, such political marketing
was not solely his making. This becomes quite clear when we explore the role played by
such diplomatic action channels as the Ivorian embassy in Washington or the office of the
First Lady before and during the visit.
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NEGOTIATING THE DIPLOMATIC PUBLIC SPHERE:
KONAN BÉDIÉ, MARIE-THÉRÈSE BROU, AND THE STATE VISIT

It is safe to argue that the man who orchestrated much of Le Vieux’s visit to the
U.S. was Henri Konan Bédié—Ivory Coast’s first ambassador to Washington. Despite his
subsequent downward spiral in Ivorian politics, Konan Bédié proved an effective
ambassador in the early 1960s.37 Born in the Baule region of central Ivory Coast in 1934,
he attended school in the territory before moving to France to complete his education in
law and economics.38 During the nationalist fevers of the decade that preceded the
decolonization of French West Africa, Bédié joined the leadership of the Association des
Etudiants de Côte d’Ivoire en France (AECIF)—a metropolitan-based collective of
Ivorian students in France—which he helped reorganize.39 In 1958, the French empire
was reinvented into a Franco-African community that gave self-governing powers to the
territories in sub-Saharan Africa. As a result of these developments, Bédié returned home
to serve in the local bureaucracy. Spotting his leadership skills as a potential asset,
Houphouët-Boigny co-opted the young Bédié whom he sent back to France for further
training in diplomacy.40 It was during this stint as an intern at the French embassy in
Washington that the Ivory Coast gained its independence in August 1960. Logically
Bédié was appointed as the Ivorian ambassador to North America, with jurisdiction over
the United States, the United Nations, and Canada.41
Houphouët-Boigny’s visit to the United States provided Bédié with the
opportunity to showcase his skills as mediator of Le Vieux’s politics of self-fashioning.
Although he was the youngest diplomat stationed in Washington at the time of his
appointment, Konan Bédié proved an effective negotiator and promoter of his country’s
image in the United States. For instance, in a still racially-intolerant federal capital, he
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bought, furnished, and made the Ivorian chancery in Washington fully operational in
record times. Along similar lines, he organized public gatherings at the embassy in an
effort to market the Ivory Coast as an attractive tourist destination.42 He deployed these
skills of a salesperson during the planning and performance of the presidential visit in
1962. Not only did Bédié forcefully push for an appropriate protocol for the visit, but he
prearranged numerous press conferences for the Ivorian president.43 Thus, as the French
ambassador in Washington would observe later, Ambassador Bédié “made sure that the
press coverage [of the state visit] was the best.”44
Henri Konan Bédié was not the only asset at the disposal of the Ivorian president.
If less visible in the political arena, Marie-Thérèse Houphouët-Boigny—the First Lady of
the Ivory Coast—also emerged as a positive feature in the overall PR strategy of Le
Vieux. Just like Ambassador Bédié and the president himself, Mme Houphouët-Boigny,
nee Brou, was born in the Baule region of the country. In 1946 she was sent to France
along with 45 other Ivorian students to complete their education. Six years later, she
married Houphouët-Boigny, the man who had orchestrated the granting of the
scholarships.45 A socialite and witty woman, Marie-Thérèse turned out to be also a
political asset for President Houphouët-Boigny, especially during Le Vieux’s visit in the
United States in 1962.46 Her beauty and elegance caught not only the attention of the
media, but even the most austere diplomats seemed to have been mesmerized by her
attractiveness and her stylish demeanor. The talk of the elite and diplomats during the
state visit, the Ivorian First Lady occupied the limelight in the columns of the celebritycraze American press. She and Jackie Kennedy shared the cover of Ebony in its summer
issue following the presidential visit. Jet magazine similarly showcased her in the cover
of its May issue while Time devoted several pages of its June issue to Marie-Thérèse,
praising both her elegance and joie de vivre.47 Recollecting the visit, if some time later,
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an American official went as far to say that Madame Houphouët-Boigny was “one of the
world’s most beautiful and best dressed women.” Hervé Alphand—the French
ambassador in Washington at the time of the visit—agreed with such assessment when he
partially credited the media success of Le Vieux’s trip to Marie-Therese’s eye-catching
smile and graceful style.48

FIGURE 1 SHOULD GO HERE

Figure 1: Elegance as Diplomatic Tool
Source: John F. Kennedy Library
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Scholars studying presidential wives and their political roles have argued that the
power relations between first ladies and their husbands are not always one-directional.
They have demonstrated that a first lady can be a liability if the popular perception of a
president’s wife is negative. In contrast, if a first lady is positively perceived in the eyes
of the public, this usually translates into political gains for her husband.49 While it is
tempting to overstate this insight, it seems that the Boignys belonged to the latter
category as the media focus on Marie-Thérèse’s glamour illustrates. President
Houphouët-Boigny may have used his wife’s attractiveness to his advantage just as he
capitalized on her chiefly origins in marrying her after the divorce from his first wife.50
Despite this scheming intent, one cannot conclude to an all-powerful Le Vieux forcing his
will on his wife. While it is clear that the Ivorian president repeatedly used his (marital or
political) partners as symbolic tools in crafting his own political career, Marie-Thérèse
was not necessarily a passive plaything that the Ivorian leader deployed at will during the
presidential visit. If anything, there was a tacit collaboration between the president and
his wife as the customary expectations from a visiting first lady merged with MarieThérèse’s own love for social life and glamour.51 An indication of this convergence was
demonstrated during a luncheon party at Robert Kennedy’s house. As a columnist of
Time magazine revealed, the chatty and outgoing Ivorian First Lady not only “switched
tables after every course” during the official gathering, but using her “exuberant,
ultrafeminine wit,” the “sensuous, luxury-loving” Marie-Thérèse Houphouët-Boigny also
teased her male admirers. “Raising [their] expectations,” she reportedly murmured: “‘I
suppose I’ll be in the swimming pool for dessert.’”52
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One need not believe that the fun-loving Ivorian Première Dame so easily crossed
the Rubicon that separates feminine charm, flirt, and promiscuity. Yet as the admiring
journalist of Time had it in the opening paragraph of her article, it may have been the case
that as part of a “new and lively generation of First Ladies,” Marie-Thérèse was indeed
“adding style and spirit to statecraft from Abidjan to Washington.”53 Through a reflected
glory effect, to be sure, her demeanor and wit brought glamour to Houphouët-Boigny’s
state visit. In a similar way, Henri Konan Bédié deployed his entrepreneurial skills to
attract the American press while, at the same time, cultivating the business and political
elites in New York and Washington. No wonder then that at the end of HouphouëtBoigny’s sojourn, he exulted that the Ivory Coast “has become a reality in the
consciousness of the American people.”54
Arguably, the efforts of the Ivorian ambassador and the public image of the First
Lady helped craft Le Vieux’s American voyage into a diplomatic event unmatched by
other state visits undertaken by African leaders to the United States. As an analysis of the
press coverage of the trip suggests, however, it was the nationalist traditions and the
chauvinistic logics of the respective media outlets that eventually came to shape the
meaning and the legacy of the diplomatic foray.

ENCOUNTERING LE VIEUX IN THE PRESS:
DIPLOMACY, JOURNALISM, AND THE POLITICS OF MEDIA COVERAGE

Commenting on the nature of official foreign visits staged by the leaders of the
newly independent countries in the Cold War era, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle suggested in
the early 1960s that such international sorties be seen as a response to psychological
demands rather than “real” diplomatic events. In recognizing this psychosocial dimension
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of official foreign visits, the French historian of foreign relations perceptively pinpointed
some of the subtleties of modern statecraft and its connection with international public
relations.55 Yet caught in the logics of an older tradition of diplomatic history, Duroselle
may have missed the point that in diplomacy, the “real” and “symbolic” fused, more
often than not, in the theater of performance. In fact, it is increasingly clear to students of
public diplomacy that symbols as part of the diplomatic packaging and symbolic
interactions in the international arena are key components of the making of a country’s
foreign relations.56 As the analysis of the media coverage of Houphouët-Boigny’s trip
will show, however, visiting leaders do not always control the outcomes of these political
performances, especially when their international sorties turn into media events.
While Le Vieux’s visit offered Ivorian hagiographers an opportunity to emphasize
the stature of the president and polish his tarnished image, journalists in France and the
United States instead opted to map out the contours of the novel triangular relations of
their respective countries with the Ivory Coast. For instance, although it devoted only
four articles to Houphouët-Boigny’s trip, the coverage of France’s premier newspaper Le
Monde hardly hid the pervasive French anxiety over what its contributors perceived as a
“revival of U.S. interest for Africa.”57 The French columnists worried about the
increasingly large number of African heads of state convening in Washington since
President Kennedy’s arrival to the White House. Emblematic of this emphasis-cumconcern was how Le Monde began its first in-depth news coverage of the Ivorian
president’s trip: “The 12th African leader to be welcomed by President Kennedy” the
French newspaper started, “Mr. Félix Houphouët-Boigny—president of the republic of
Ivory Coast, was received at the [U.S.] federal capital’s National Airport with all the
honor due to a guest of his rank.”58 More disturbing for Le Monde was that Le Vieux
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broke the record for the longest stay by an African leader in the United States. Under
these circumstances, the liberal-leaning Parisian daily emphatically concluded that the
American authorities treated Houphouët-Boigny as a “true partner.”59
Coverage of Le Vieux’s trip in the U.S. print media might have added to the extant
French apprehensions. In effect, while both the New York Times and the Washington Post
highlighted the historic ties between France and its former colony, neither suggested the
need for applying what might be called the “NATO courtesy,” that is, the tacit rule
among the members of the Atlantic Alliance that none should infringe on the others’
geopolitical spheres of influence .60 In fact, the opposite was true as the Washington Post
seemed to take some kind of delight as it repeatedly stressed the new-found friendship
between the U.S. and Ivory Coast. Echoing some of the confidential observations of the
diplomats at the State Department, the American journalists mapped out a triangular
relationship among the United States, France, and Ivory Coast that the West Africans
hoped to use to move beyond their reliance on Europe. While the Cold War context was
never lost, the American media played out the card of post-colonial rapprochement
between Abidjan and Washington.61
As could be expected, Ivory Coast’s Abidjan-Matin and Fraternité were the most
prolific in reporting on the presidential trip. With regard to the seemingly romantic
triangle between Ivory Coast, France, and the United States, both Ivorian publications
displayed a degree of dexterity. As they strived to maintain that Houphouët-Boigny and
his wife were heirs to the French tradition of cosmopolitanism, the Ivorian print media
subtly emphasized that the U.S. provided a better model for technological development.62
However, it was through their glamorization of Le Vieux that both Abidjan-Matin and
Fraternité succeeded in overcoming the tension inherent in the triangular diplomatic
relations that the trip of the Ivorian president epitomized.
Glamorization, as symbolic construction of Houphouët-Boigny’s authority, was
carried out both by words and in images. In the news-stories, the prestige of the Ivorian
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president was constructed using various modalities: association with celebrities as when
the columnist of Abidjan-Matin mentioned emphatically that Le Vieux, upon arrival in
Washington, was welcomed by President Kennedy “in person.”63 The glamorization of
the Ivorian head of state was also achieved through linguistic modalization with a
recurrent deployment of such loaded adjectives as “prestigious,” “triumphal,”
“luxurious,” and other positively indexed superlatives.64 Even more suggestive of the
image-building and glamour-seeking agendas of the Ivorian journalists was the frontpage news photo of Fraternité, featuring Houphouët-Boigny’s tour of the U.S. federal
capital.65
Scholars of visual communication have yet to settle the debates on the legibility
of visual images and their argumentative values.66 Few readers of the Ivorian publication,
however, might have questioned the suggestive power of the Tour photo: besides the
geometrical figures (triangles, squares, straight lines), showing the entire procession
together with alignment of people and the waving flags all converge to produce a colorful
and, most importantly, a triumphalist picture. In line with a tradition that has usually
hailed leaders as if they were wrapped in a divine aura that made them irresistible, the
Ivorian press painted Le Vieux as a celebrity-like figure who was beloved by the
American public. A comparison of related visual argumentations in the American press
further highlights this point. Whereas the photographic coverage in the U.S. print media
focused more regularly on Mme Marie-Thérèse Houphouët-Boigny with what appears as
three gendered pictures featuring her as major anchor, the Ivory Coast press turned its
hagiographic gaze almost exclusively at Le Vieux, with almost half of all its news
photographs covering the presidential visit.
Admittedly this hagiographic practice points to the collusion between the media
as an institution and the Ivorian state as embodied in Le Vieux. More generally,
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journalistic practices in Ivory Coast seem to single the country out as the site of media
routines so different from the communicational performances in both France and the
United States. Eurocentric media scholars of the Siebertian tradition would not have
disagreed with such conclusion. However, as one shifts the analysis away from the
journalistic coverage of the presidential trip and focuses on the deconstruction of the
meta-cultural logic of news reporting, it becomes apparent that journalists in Ivory Coast,
France, and the United States all subscribed to a modernist metaphysics that attempted to
consolidate the position of their respective nation-states.

BEYOND THE NEWS:
MODERNITY AND THE NATIONALIST LOGICS OF MEDIA DIPLOMACY

A closer look at the coverage of Le Vieux’s state visit reveals the intimacy
between news reporting as textual practice and nationhood—posited as relentlessly
negotiated textual ventures. Quite a few scholars have evoked this articulation of
nationness through textuality.67 Even more, it appears that journalistic performances, as
technologies inscribing the “imagined community,” help the nation to implement its triple
projects of political rationalization, hegemonic consolidation, and preservation of
sovereignty. In this light, the glamorization of Houphouët-Boigny in the Ivorian press
assumed more than a function of hagiographic capitalization. For even though Le Vieux
would have been the first to reap the dividends of the mediatic foray into international
public relations, the dissemination of his symbolic authority in the Ivorian newspapers
potentially extended the reach of the “political rationality” of the nation-state that Le
Vieux so typically personified in the eyes of the Ivorian journalists.
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Mitchell Land’s conclusions about how television was used in the Ivory Coast to
foster modernization can provide a useful context for understanding this seeming alliance
between the press and the state. In a country with more than 60 ethnicities, the media was
conceived and mobilized to foster nation-building. As those in power came to fret over
the idea that Le Vieux embodied the nation, the celebration of Houphouët-Boigny became
synonymous with nation-building. For Land, such a practice led to a kind of onedimensional thinking which he saw as rather contrary to traditional communication
practices in pre-colonial Africa.68 Although Land’s perceptible nostalgia over the bygone
palaver tree might be problematic, his insight still helps underline that media
performances in the Ivory Coast were a technology of, and for, the nation-state.
A similar claim might be applicable to the United States, especially with regard to
the role of the media in the emergence of the “political ‘rationality’ of the nation as a
form of narrative.”69 The history of such emergence may be too tortuous to outline here.
With Benedict Anderson, however, one can observe that “from the start the nation was
conceived in language, not in blood.”70 Even more enlightening is how replete with
gendered metaphors the language of nationalism has always been. Vicente Rafael has
shown this in the case of the United States’ pro-imperial nationalism in his account of
U.S.-Filipino colonial encounter. In fact, more often than not, U.S. nationalism posited
the colonial Other as an effeminate character awaiting conquest by the supposedly virile
and more progressive U.S. culture.71
With this history in mind, the masculinist gaze of the U.S. press’s visual coverage
of Le Vieux’s voyage becomes even more significant. By focusing on the leftout
signifiers of the American press reportage of the visit, Ivory Coast metonymically
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emerges as a feminized subject that has to be denied to the French; a beautiful body that
has to be devoured visually and consumed metaphorically.72 In this light, along with the
Ivorian First Lady, Ivory Coast became a malleable object upon which the U.S., as
hegemon, could exercise the power of its masculinity. As they indulged in this gendered
nationalist project, the U.S. press not only mapped the boundaries of the local and the
foreign, but its journalists also furthered the neo-imperial project of Washington. Thus,
though the 1960s witnessed a shift onto reporting in the U.S. news media as Jean Folkerts
and Dwight Teeter have judiciously suggested, the cultural logic that sustained the
journalistic performances of the New York Times and the Washington Post remained
ontologically the same: to extend the imperial élan of the U.S. soft power.73 Intuitive
knowledge of this agenda on the part of some French politicians partly explained the
obsessive suspicion of French President Charles de Gaulle and his advisors.74
French journalists too were certainly aware of the hegemonic intent of the United
States as superpower. Rather than address the issue frontally in the Gaullist way,
however, contributors to Le Monde claimed that Washington “acknowledge[d] the key
role that former ‘colonial’ powers [must] play in [their] African territories.”75 Earlier on,
the newspaper’s envoyé spécial covering Houphouët-Boigny’s visit had reported along
similar lines. The journalist had emphasized that in each of his meetings Le Vieux “never
failed to stress that the U.S. assistance would simply complement the aid provided by the
French.”76 There are grounds to believe in the observation of Le Monde’s special
correspondent. In fact, career diplomats in the United States had recognized as early as
1961 that France would have to “carry the main burden and responsibility for Ivory Coast
development.”77 Still, unlike the French journalists, the U.S. authorities assumed that the
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Ivorians wished to “broaden their contacts and assert a more independent role.” It is
certainly in this light that the first objective of the U.S. aid program to the Ivory Coast
was to “[s]how the non-colonial U.S. interest in Ivory Coast economic development.”78
Taking the “hot peace” between the U.S. and France in the 1960s and the decolonization
of Africa as historical backdrops, the journalists’ downplaying of U.S. hegemonic design
appears as a strategy mobilized by Le Monde to reassure its French readers over the
emasculation of their “imagined community” and the mandarins who oversee its interests
in the pré carré.

CONCLUSION

In hindsight, the outcomes of Houphouët-Boigny’s first official trip to the United
States were significant in reinforcing the subsequent U.S.-Ivory Coast relations. During
the tumultuous 1960s, however, diplomats from the Ivory Coast, France, and the United
States continued to argue over the political meaning of the visit. Whereas all agreed that
Le Vieux came off the visit satisfied, some sources suggested that he left Washington
with fewer economic promises than anticipated.79 My intention in this article was not to
settle such a dispute. Nor was I interested in assessing the huge bill that such trip might
have required on Ivorian public finances.80 Rather, I meant to complicate the story of
modern statecraft and diplomacy as applied to the making of U.S.-Africa relations. By
focusing on the state visit of Houphouët-Boigny, I wanted to showcase some of the
entrepreneurial skills of African diplomats and heads of state in the aftermath of colonial
rule and suggest how effective they were in mobilizing the mass media and the larger PR
techniques to further their objectives. As African leaders indulged in self-fashioning
beyond the familiar terrain of domestic politics, they recast conventional diplomatic
roles. In many ways, Houphouët-Boigny’s American sortie exemplifies this statecraft. As
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this article has made it clear, however, the management of both Le Vieux’s image as a
statesman and his staged trip were the locus of divergent interests and conflicting
journalistic practices. While the Ivorian press strove to build a hagiographic picture of the
trip and the African statesman himself, both the French and American media mapped out
the contours of a new transatlantic world that Houphouët-Boigny’s tour put into relief.
Despite their difference, however, one should not lose sight of the centrality of the
nation-state as the meta-cultural signifier that informed media performances in Ivory
Coast, France, and the United States. As a matter of fact, the three different journalistic
traditions certainly spoke three different dialects, but three dialects of the same language:
that of the modern nation-state. This focus on language or the nation as textuality calls for
a systematic reappraisal of the comparativist historiography on international media. Even
more, the dexterity shown by Henri Konan Bédié in crafting the visit reminds us that
African diplomats in Washington, D.C. and New York City were dynamic historical
actors in the performance of U.S.-Africa relations.
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